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Foreword
Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself? was conceived on the idea that 
Europe – which at the time (in 2015) was thoroughly bogged 
down with the migrant crisis, economic crisis and a counter-
terror crisis – was also experiencing a new type of crisis. One 
less visible, but with the potential to become just as important. 
In the declining level of political engagement and trust, the 
growth of populist parties and anti-immigrant sentiment,   
we saw a common thread of fear weaving its way through 
European societies, with the potential to foster a divisive new 
political culture, to destabilise democratic governance, and 
to challenge the ‘liberal consensus’ of modern times. Even so, 
18 months ago we could not have imagined we would ever 
arrive where we are now.
This project has sought to capture a snapshot of the 
common and unique manifestations of fear and insecurity 
across Europe in a moment that feels particularly important. 
There is a sense that we are standing on the edge of a new 
era, one where the core tenets of the past half-century – of 
representative democracy as an inherent good, of unfettered 
globalisation, of greater mixing of people, goods and ideas 
across the world – are being held to trial, challenged, and 
potentially turned away from all together. Just as the changes 
our European societies have experienced in absorbing this age 
of free trade, movement and ideas have fostered fears and 
insecurities, so too does the next phase ahead feel uncertain 
and unchartered – particularly for those who felt safe in what 
we had before.
It is clear that the era we are leaving has caused some 
parts of our societies to feel disenfranchised and disconnected. 
Too many political leaders, from both the left and the right, 
have viewed success in primarily economic terms, and have 
missed simmering social and cultural crises that can feel more 
important to ordinary people’s day-to-day lives. The sense of 
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being displaced or ignored, the demoralising impact of 
precarious work, the loss of culture and community, the 
feeling of no longer belonging where you once felt at home. 
Even now, as this research shows, these concerns are often 
dismissed as intangible, or ‘emotional’ in nature – as if not 
being able to be measured empirically, or addressed through 
the traditional prisms of public policy, somehow impeaches 
their significance.
The political upheavals we have witnessed throughout 
the course of the project – and the ones that are perhaps yet 
to come – should underscore to any politicians or institutions 
the risk that is posed to stability, openness and cohesion 
by allowing citizens’ fears to bud and flourish. Let us be 
clear: this is not the time to turn our backs on the many 
achievements that have also been made over recent decades 
– not least of all in social liberalism; improved equality of 
opportunity across gender, ethnicity and sexual orientation; 
education; international cooperation; conservation; 
technology, health and innovation. These gains need to be 
defended, and further advanced, even in the face of growing 
authoritarian and nationalist attitudes. What is evident from 
this research project is that this will only be possible if we 
recognise and address the insecurities plaguing so many 
citizens’ lives, because – as humans – we are at our most 
altruistic, generous, inclusive and community-minded when 
we feel safe.
I would like to first thank the Open Societies 
Foundation, and in particular Christal Morehouse, Goran 
Buldioski and Heather Grabbe, for their unfailing support 
for this project. I would also like to thank the scores of 
immensely bright, perceptive and enthusiastic people who 
have contributed to this project across Europe, including 
journalists, think tankers, NGO staff, politicians, academics, 
policy-makers and civil society organisations. The issues 
addressed in this project are bigger than all of us, and the 
generous spirit of collaboration from a broad consortium of 
stakeholders is tremendously encouraging. I am grateful to 
our partner organisations – d|part in Germany, the Jacques 
Delors Institute in France, FORES in Sweden, the Institute 
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of Public Affairs in Poland and the Elcano Institute in Spain, 
who have produced such high quality research, and worked so 
closely with us throughout this project. At Demos, I recognise 
the outstanding contribution of our chief executive Claudia 
Wood, as well as research colleagues Peter Harrison-Evans 
and Sacha Hilhorst, and Alex Porter. Ralph Scott and Charlie 
Cadywould, who have since moved on to other organisations, 
were also integral to this project and key authors on the UK 
case study.
As always, any errors or omissions in this report as 
a whole remain those of the authors.
Sophie Gaston, Demos 
2017
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Introduction
There is a spectre haunting Europe: a culture of fear that 
is finding its form and asserting its growing influence in 
myriad ways.
This is a fear of the unknown: a fear of the other, a fear 
of the future. Its political consequences have been shown most 
starkly in the UK’s vote to leave the European Union, and 
the electoral success of authoritarian governments in central 
Europe. However, fear is also taking hold of the politics of 
other European nations, marked by the growing success of 
other ‘populist’ right-wing and Eurosceptic parties, including 
the Front National, Alternative für Deutschland, and the 
Swedish Democrats, as well as the rise of street movements 
such as the anti-Islamic Pegida. This new populist politics   
is having tangible effects on national public policy, through 
tighter border controls, the erosion of liberal freedoms and 
so-called ‘welfare chauvinism’, where social security eligibility 
is made ever-stricter. Its social impact can be seen in the 
increasingly nativist and ‘othering’ discourse in the public 
realm; the disintegration of civil society and declining 
social rust; and the resurgence of exclusive national and 
regional identities.
The drivers of this are as multifarious and indeterminate 
as their effects. If ‘fear’ does not quite do it justice, then 
perhaps we are talking about what sociologist Zygmunt 
Bauman calls Unsicherheit – ‘that complex combination   
of uncertainty, insecurity, and lack of safety’ which results   
from the economic, social and cultural consequences of 
globalisation, and their entanglement with national, regional 
and local contexts.
Some drivers and symptoms of the politics of fear are, 
therefore, specific to particular regions or countries, however 
many exhibit some level of commonality across EU member 
states. It seems clear, then, that this is not an isolated 
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phenomenon with causes to be unpicked, but is part of   
a wider rising tide that cuts across traditional geographic, 
political, and analytical boundaries. This fear threatens   
not only the transnational solidarity underpinning the 
European project, but the stability of free and open societies 
across Europe.
This project led by the think tank Demos, working in 
partnership with think tanks and academic researchers in   
five other European countries, has set out to explore this 
culture of fear, understand its influence on social and   
political attitudes and behaviour, and develop ideas to tackle 
it. Through cross-national, as well as country-specific, polling, 
supplemented by qualitative research, this study maps the 
current political landscape and provides a detailed analysis 
of public attitudes across France, Germany, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. By drawing together this 
analysis we assess the way forward for political leaders to 
restore a more positive and inclusive political culture within 
individual nation-states and across the European Union.
Our approach
The starting premise for our research contends that the 
politics and culture of fear cannot be treated as a discrete 
phenomenon to be studied in isolation but must instead be 
observed through the analysis of other social and political 
trends. With this in mind we identified five key themes to 
frame our subsequent investigation:
 · party politics: the rise of populist parties and ‘anti-politics’, 
with declining trust and participation in electoral politics
 · public policy: restrictions on citizenship and access to public 
services and welfare, rising state authoritarianism, and an 
increased reliance on directly democratic decision-making
 · social cohesion: declining social cohesion, particularly between 
different ethnic and religious groups, and real and perceived 
problems of social integration
 · political narratives and rhetoric: changes in public discourse – 
whether media framing, the rhetoric employed by politicians 
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or through social media – with an increase in ‘othering’ 
language and framing
 · citizens: including perceptions of identity, rising exclusive 
nationalist sentiments, and feelings of pessimism   
and insecurity
We selected six EU member states – France, Germany, 
Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK – to act as a barometer 
through which to analyse and explore these five core themes. 
These six countries were chosen, in part, to represent a 
breadth of experiences and outcomes across the EU – for 
example, when looking at party politics our case studies 
reflect a range of circumstances from the electoral victory of 
an authoritarian populist party in Poland to a relative absence 
of right-wing populists in Spain. However, we also selected 
countries which help to highlight emerging and common 
trends across Europe – on narrative, for example, we have 
seen a turn towards more nationalistic political discourse in 
many of our chosen countries – from a greater emphasis on 
‘Swedish values’ by populist and mainstream politicians in 
Sweden, to the nationalistic, and at times xenophobic, 
campaigning around the EU referendum in the UK.
Our overarching method has been to establish common 
research questions and approaches across the countries, while 
also conducting more detailed country-specific analysis, 
employing a range of different research methodologies. As 
well as working with our research partners, we have also 
sought input from a wider group of academic, policy and 
civil society leaders and experts through a series of workshops, 
which have helped frame the research, explore emerging 
findings and develop possible solutions. The study’s 
methodology can, therefore, be broken down into three 
constituent parts:
 · Cross-national polling: Demos commissioned YouGov to 
conduct an online survey of adults (aged 18 and over)   
across our six countries (UK polling did not survey adults in 
Northern Ireland, therefore when referring to polling we use 
the term Great Britain). The polling asked common questions 
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across all six countries, with a focus on public attitudes 
to the EU, globalisation, societal changes (eg increasing 
diversity), and political leadership and trust. Samples across 
the six countries were weighted to ensure the findings were 
representative of national populations.1
 · National case study research: Demos commissioned case studies 
produced by independent think tanks in five of the six 
countries, with Demos conducting the case study research 
for the UK. The case studies used additional country-specific 
polling (with additional questions added to the cross-national 
survey conducted by YouGov), combined with a range of 
different methodologies, including qualitative interviews   
with politicians (Germany), regression modelling (UK),   
and discourse and textual analysis (Sweden and Poland).
 · Expert workshops: Demos convened workshops in Brussels   
with academic, policy and civil society leaders and experts 
from the six case study countries, together with delegates 
with Europe-wide expertise, including EU policy leaders and 
journalists. The first workshop involved facilitated discussion 
around the five key themes, to provide expert input to frame 
and guide the subsequent polling and case study research. 
The second workshop was conducted over two days, during 
the first of which delegates debated emergent findings of the 
research, while the second focused on gaining insights about 
potential policy and civil society responses.
In the following sections of this chapter we set out the current 
political context behind this research, discuss the findings of 
the cross-national polling, and give an introduction to the six 
country case studies.
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Context and background
The current era is one of rapid, and at times bewildering, 
political and social change, in which there have been 
significant shifts in public opinion over a short space of time, 
together with seismic events that have confounded expert 
predictions. It increasingly feels as if crisis after crisis rattle 
through the political and media landscape, leaving pre-
existing institutions with little time to adapt. Fear is often 
both a product of and a response to this pace of change, 
contributing to a growing sense of precariousness and anxiety 
among European publics, at times exploited by insurgent or 
even mainstream political figures.
There is, therefore, a growing sense of urgency in the 
need to understand the drivers and symptoms of rapidly 
shifting tides across our five thematic areas – party politics, 
policy, society, narrative and individual identity – and build 
coalitions across disciplinary and political divides to develop 
effective responses. Below we review the current picture across 
the five themes, as the first step to getting to grips with the 
current situation.
Party politics
While 2016 has been widely viewed as the year in which 
authoritarian populist politics broke through to the 
‘mainstream’, the steady rise of populist parties across Europe 
can be traced back to at least the European elections of 2009, 
when the likes of the British National Party, Hungary’s 
Jobbik, the Austrian Freedom Party and the True Finns made 
significant electoral inroads. By the 2014 European elections 
the gains made by populist parities were brought into far 
sharper relief. In France, Marine Le Pen’s Front National 
topped the polls, while anti-EU UK Independence Party 
(UKIP) won the most votes in the UK. There were similar 
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trends in Austria, where the Freedom Party increased its 
vote share, Germany, where the new party Alternative für 
Deutschland won its first seats, Italy, with initial success for 
Grillo’s Five Star Movement, and many other countries.2
In the years since 2014 successes in European elections 
have increasingly been replicated in populist gains in national 
and regional elections. This has been most starkly shown 
through the victory of the Law and Justice party in the 2015 
Polish parliamentary elections. However, there have also been 
significant gains for other populist parties, across Europe. 
In Germany, for example, anti-European Alternative für 
Deutschland received double-digit shares of the vote in all the 
regional elections in March 2016, before surging to 21 per cent 
in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in September 2016, finishing 
above the Christian Democratic Union in Angela Merkel’s 
home state. In Austria, the 2016 presidential election between 
the Green Party’s Alexander Van der Bellen and the far-right 
Freedom Party’s Norbert Hofer was notable. First, it was the 
first time since the Second World War that an Austrian 
president had not been backed by either of the two 
establishment parties. Second, while there was widespread 
international relief that Van der Bellen claimed victory in the 
re-run of the election in December, this still left 46 per cent 
of the vote going to the far-right candidate. In the UK, while 
UKIP was restricted to just one seat in the 2015 general 
election thanks to the first-past-the-post electoral system, the 
party managed to gain nearly 13 per cent of the popular vote.
It is worth noting that despite often being referred   
to as ‘far right’, many of these groups are not easily placed 
according to traditional political categories, often combining 
elements of left-wing and right-wing philosophy, mixed with 
populist language and rhetoric. For example, under Marine 
Le Pen, the Front National has campaigned from a strongly 
left-wing position on welfare, while taking a far-right position 
on immigration. In some ways, this leaves these parties with 
a greater capacity to capitalise on the changing contours of 
national political debates. Recent referendums have produced 
voting patterns which cut across traditional party lines, and 
this highlights the waning of the left–right paradigm as the 
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major dividing line in politics, with others schisms – such 
as young vs old, educated vs uneducated, open vs closed 
(or in Le Pen’s words, ‘globalists’ vs ‘patriots’) – becoming 
increasingly significant.
That said, there have also been major gains for   
anti-establishment, populist parties from a more resolutely 
left-wing position, including Podemos in Spain, and   
most notably Syriza in Greece. ‘Populist’ is therefore an 
all-embracing term that brings together very different   
political entities. However, while the term ‘populism’ is not 
without its conceptual problems, populist parties at the very 
broadest level tend to have a similar world view, one defined 
by prominent political scientist Cas Mudde as:
an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into 
two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus 
‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an 
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.3
For left-wing populist parties, this concept of ‘the people’ 
may be framed particularly to exclude financial elites, using 
language such as the ‘99 per cent’. For right-wing populist 
parties, ‘the people’ is typically bound to the idea of the 
nation, which may exclude non-elite groups such as welfare 
recipients, immigrants and ethnic and religious minorities 
(albeit often constructed as receiving undeserved support 
from elites).4 In both cases, however, growing populist 
support reflects a deep distrust in, or a rejection of, the current 
political system, which represents a substantial challenge to 
mainstream parties.
Public policy
Anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic rhetoric is exerting an 
influence on policy across Europe. In some cases this is the 
result of populist parties in government. For example, once 
in power the Law and Justice party reversed the previous 
government’s pledge to accept 7,000 refugees, citing concerns 
around terrorism and disease; Jaroslaw Kaczynsk accused 
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refugees of ‘bringing in all kinds of parasites’.5 In June 
2016, Poland also passed new anti-terrorism laws introducing 
measures such as the wiretapping of foreign citizens without 
a court order. Critics argue that these laws are inconsistent 
with the European Convention on Human Rights.
Some commentators have argued that this combination 
of anti-immigrant and authoritarian policy change seen in 
Poland reflects the Law and Justice party ‘learning from 
the Hungarians’ in their approach.6 Since regaining the 
premiership in 2010, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
has been criticised for cracking down on media freedom and 
political accountability, as well as exploiting terrorist attacks 
in Europe to spread fear and promote Islamophobia and a 
narrow, ethnic nationalism. The policy agendas of both 
governments have brought them into open conflict with the 
European Union – Hungary for its treatment of migrants, and 
Poland for changes to the country’s constitutional court and 
state media – which have led to threats to sanction these 
countries under Article 7 for violating fundamental EU rights.
Even where populist parties have not formed 
governments, the politics of fear has asserted its influence 
on policy through restrictions on welfare and social security 
provision, driven in part by financial constraints, but also 
a more politicised weakening of social bonds and solidarity. 
A number of states have recently attempted to tighten 
eligibility rules for immigrants. This was at the forefront of 
David Cameron’s EU renegotiation (a now largely academic 
exercise), which included an ‘emergency brake’ on in-work 
benefits for EU migrants. Welfare chauvinism towards 
migrants is part of a wider and much longer-running trend 
towards tightening eligibility and reduced generosity in 
many countries’ welfare regimes, however.
Austerity policies, largely implemented by establishment 
parties in the wake of the financial crisis, have led to 
significant falls in welfare spending in many countries. 
According to the OECD’s social expenditure index, spending 
to gross domestic product (GDP) ratios declined between 
2009 and 2014 by 1.5 to 2.5 percentage points in Germany, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland and the UK.7 In Greece, the impact 
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of austerity measures imposed by the troika of the  
European Central Bank, the European Commission   
and the International Monetary Fund led to a sharp fall in   
spending-to-GDP of 2 percentage points in just two years.   
In 2016 alone, Greece slashed public spending by €5.7 billion.8
More fundamentally, there has also been a restructuring 
of the social contract in many countries, and a re-imagining of 
what constitutes a deserving or undeserving welfare recipient. 
This is linked to longer-running trends towards the activating 
welfare state, which places greater emphasis on active labour 
market policies and benefit conditionality. German academics 
Peter Bleses and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser have described the 
‘dual transformation’ of the German welfare state, which has 
experienced a significant expansion of family policy (to 
support female labour market participation), combined with 
a far-reaching retrenchment in unemployment protection.9
The policy direction of governments is both shaping 
and being shaped by public opinion, which in many cases 
has hardened on welfare. According to the most recent 
British Social Attitudes Survey, 45 per cent of people said 
that spending on unemployment benefit should be reduced 
and 60 per cent said unemployment benefit receipt should be 
time limited.10 The recent British Social Attitudes Survey also 
found that 61 per cent of people agreed that a working-age 
couple without children who are struggling to make ends meet 
should ‘look after themselves’, rather than getting government 
support to boost their wages. While Britain may be somewhat 
of an outlier on welfare solidarity, academics Paul de Beer and 
Ferry Koster have argued that there is, at least, a broader shift 
across Europe from one-sided solidarity (assisting someone 
else without expecting anything in return) to two-sided 
solidarity, playing into narratives of a ‘something for 
something’ culture.11 Levels of social trust have been shown 
to be a key ingredient of public support for the welfare state 
– therefore the divisive political rhetoric that typifies the 
politics of fear represents a substantial threat to the social 
contract across Europe.12
Against a backdrop of an ever-present threat of 
terrorism, it is not surprisingly that many leaders are 
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themselves embodying the fear of their citizens in hardening 
security and migration practices. Border checks and controls 
have been re-imposed in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Norway and Sweden.13 However, the response to the migration 
crisis also reflects fears more related to a sense of erosion of 
cultural and social identity. Some governments, with the 
notable exception of Germany, have refused to take large 
numbers of refugees, in part due to the fear of losing support 
to populist parties.
The current political landscape in Denmark, with a 
right-wing minority government, dependent on support from 
the anti-immigrant Danish People’s Party, has encouraged a 
hard-line position on refugees, out of step with the country’s 
reputation as a bastion of social democratic generosity. 
Denmark’s response to the refugee crisis has become   
defined by a series of controversial measures, including the 
slashing of refugee benefits, placing advertising in Lebanese 
newspapers urging refugees not to come, and most notably 
the passing of a law which enables the authorities to seize 
refugees’ cash and valuables. Most recently, the Danish 
government has indefinitely suspended a programme to 
receive around 500 refugees per year through the UN 
Refugee Agency.14
Populist rhetoric has exerted an influence on the broader 
policy agendas of mainstream governments and political 
parties, which have often taken what Matthew Goodwin   
terms an ‘adoptive’ strategy to responding to populist 
insurgencies.15 In France, for example, measures have been   
put in place to reduce access to citizenship, so that now the 
children of immigrants no longer gain citizenship at birth,   
but at the age of 18, and only once they show themselves to   
be ‘well assimilated to customs and manners’. The national 
government in France has been unable to challenge 
successfully the highly controversial ban on burkinis on public 
beaches, which was introduced in over 30 municipalities.
Finally, it is also important to recognise recent changes 
to the policy process itself that are influenced by this culture 
and politics of fear. Declining trust in politicians generally 
and an increased emphasis on a ‘purer’ (more direct) form 
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of democracy has led governments across Europe to respond 
positively to calls for more referendums.16 In the 1970s, Europe 
averaged just three referendums a year – The Economist 
estimates that figure to now stand at eight. In 2016 alone, there 
were major referendums in the Netherlands (on the Ukraine–
EU Association Agreement), the UK (on EU membership), 
Italy (on its constitution) and Hungary (on migrant quotas).
The growth in the number of referendums can be seen to 
reflect politicians promoting a more inclusive form of politics, 
but they have been proven in many cases to encourage divisive 
public discourse built around binary narratives, and are 
largely considered unsuitable as a mechanism for most 
complex or constitutional matters – particularly if there is 
little chance that citizens can be sufficiently educated in the 
subjects at hand.17 While encouraging political participation, 
referendums have the power to destabilise and disempower 
more deliberative and representative forms of democracy 
on which most European societies are founded.
Social cohesion
Freedom of movement within Europe, immigration from 
outside the EU and the ongoing migrant crisis have raised 
questions about how new arrivals should best be integrated 
into existing societies. Numerous populist politicians have 
argued that the pace of change has been too quick, that new 
arrivals have tended to separate themselves off from the rest 
of society, and that indigenous cultures are under threat. In 
December 2016, 45 per cent of respondents to a Eurobarometer 
survey named immigration as one of their most important 
concerns at EU level, with 20 per cent naming terrorism, 
the second most common response.18
Whether this apparent lack of integration leads to 
cultural and social conflict is a matter of fierce debate – and 
nowhere is the fear of cultural threat felt and exploited more 
than with Islam. Jeffrey Alexander claims that a backlash 
against the ‘multiculturalist’ approach to integration   
began in the mid-1990s, and sped up following 9/11. In 2008   
David Cameron called multiculturalism a ‘dangerous’ and 
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‘wrong-headed doctrine’, and in recent years French 
commentators have spoken of ‘Balkanisation’, while the 
German discussion has used the term ‘parallel societies’.19 
Alexander argues: ‘One European nation after another 
has shifted… from entertaining a more multicultural to 
demanding a more assimilative mode of incorporation.’20
The Cologne assaults in early January 2016 and incidents 
of home-grown terrorism have raised the profile of problems 
of social integration, and linked immigration directly to 
feelings of physical insecurity. This has been seen in a 
hardening of attitudes to migrants – particularly in Germany: 
while only one-third of the population thought that their 
‘country already has a large number of foreign nationals  
or people of foreign origin and it is not possible to host 
additional immigrants’ in September 2015, that proportion 
had increased to half by March 2016.
EU citizens are far less likely to feel comfortable working 
alongside a Muslim (71 per cent) than a Christian (94 per cent), 
atheist (87 per cent), Jew (84 per cent) or Buddhist (81 per cent). 
The figure for Muslims is far lower in some countries, such as 
Czech Republic (just 27 per cent comfortable) and Slovakia (37 
per cent comfortable). Similarly, just 50 per cent would feel 
comfortable with their son or daughter being in a relationship 
with a Muslim person, with 30 per cent saying they would be 
uncomfortable. In many countries the numbers are much 
lower: just 12 per cent of Czech respondents would be 
comfortable with their son or daughter being in a relationship 
with a Muslim, with less than half agreeing in many EU-15 
countries too: Italy (41 per cent), Germany (43 per cent), 
Austria (44 per cent) and Belgium (47 per cent).
The most recent Eurobarometer survey on discrimination 
in the EU gives us some insight into the scale of the problems 
experienced by minorities. Thirty per cent of participants 
belonging to an ethnic minority group said they had 
experienced discrimination or harassment related to their 
ethnicity in the previous 12 months.21 Twenty-two per cent   
of those from a religious minority said they had experienced 
discrimination or harassment on the grounds of their religion 
or beliefs.
Context and background
While often primarily considered in terms of race 
relations, social cohesion has also been eroding in European 
countries across other spheres of interaction and relationships. 
The elections held in 2016, and the campaigns under way 
in 2017, have exposed a multitude of social and attitudinal 
schisms across European societies. The traditional binary 
division in politics based largely on class (blue-collar–white-
collar; left–right) has been supplemented, or even superseded, 
by emerging divisions – between age groups, ethnic  
groups, graduates and non-graduates, and urban and rural 
communities – which are increasingly defined by their social 
values and economic status. There is a sense that social 
fragmentation is both increasing and hardening, with citizens 
increasingly unlikely to mix with their counterparts across 
the new dividing lines.
Education has been shown to be at the centre of many 
of these emergent social schisms. The Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation in the UK found that educational opportunity 
was ‘the biggest driver’ of the Brexit vote, with 75 per cent of 
voters with postgraduate qualifications in favour of Remain, 
and 73 per cent of those without qualifications voting for 
Leave.22 While educational divides can be lazily caricatured 
as the informed vs the uniformed, British sociologist David 
Runciman has written convincingly about the impact of 
higher education – not in correcting for political or economic 
ignorance, but instead acting as a socialising force promoting 
liberal and cosmopolitan values.23
While the new dividing lines cut across European 
countries, where particular social groups stand on key issues 
can vary markedly between member states. Age, for example, 
is becoming an increasingly important predictor of attitudes 
and voting intentions. In Western and Northern Europe 
younger people tend to have more liberal and internationalist 
views. However, the reverse is true in parts of Central Europe 
where younger people have been far more receptive to far-right 
nationalist rhetoric than older generations. The proportion of 
young people voting for Jobbik in Hungary, Law and Justice 
in Poland, and the far-right Kotleba party in Slovakia in 
recent elections has outstripped that of the wider population.24 
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While the Central European case is perhaps more alarming, 
growing inter-generational divides on either side of the 
political spectrum threaten social cohesion, particularly  
in the context of an ageing population reliant on social 
security transfers from young to old.
Social fragmentation of values and demographics is in 
some cases set within more tangible geographic fragmentation 
driven by secessionist movements, most notably in Scotland 
and Catalonia. Although these campaigns have so far been 
defeated or constrained, the Brexit vote has heightened the 
chances of a second Scottish independence vote, and Carles 
Puigdemont, the head of the Catalonian government, has 
insisted that a referendum on independence will take place 
in September 2017 (in defiance of the Spanish government’s 
position). European and national political leaders clearly fear 
that success in either of these elections could spark a further 
disintegration of European political space.
Political narratives and rhetoric
Changing political narratives and language have in part 
been driven by the rise of populist parties, whose rhetoric 
has gained increased prominence as a result of electoral 
success. Populist discourse preys on a sense of precariousness 
in social and cultural identities through appealing to binary 
distinctions, encouraging gang-like mentalities that drive 
cleavages between different groups. These may take the form 
of hyper-patriotic nationalism against cosmopolitanism; of   
the ‘deserving’ recipients of state welfare and users of public 
services against undeserving interlopers and charlatans; or 
the authentic, salt-of-the-earth ‘people’ against the bloated, 
out-of-touch establishment and ruling elites.
These divisions are powerful in their ability to shape 
social relations, set a framework for acceptable public   
debate, and become normalised through mainstream   
political parties and the media. In their study of political 
speeches and rhetoric, Ruth Wodak and Salomi Boukala 
examine speeches given by Geert Wilders and David Cameron 
in detail. 
Context and background
They argue:
Debates about European identities – especially since the financial 
crisis of 2008 – have increasingly been accompanied by debates 
about both more traditional racialised cultural concerns and more 
recently, about economic security, leading to new distinctions 
between ‘Us’, the ‘real Europeans’, and ‘Them’, the ‘Others’.25
The most prominent example of the influence of divisive 
populist rhetoric has been the mainstreaming of strongly 
negative depictions of immigrants. Analysis of national 
newspapers in the UK by the Oxford Migration Observatory 
showed that the most common descriptor for the word 
‘immigrants’ was ‘illegal’. Other consistent terms found 
nearby in newspaper copy included those around legality 
and security (‘terrorist’, ‘suspected’, ‘sham’), and those using 
water-based imagery (‘flood’, ‘influx’, ‘wave’).26 Similarly, 
Alexander Caviedes’ study of centre-right national newspapers 
in Britain, France and Italy found that 39 per cent of articles 
related to immigration had a focus on security between 2008 
and 2012. Most of these related to border controls, although 
in the UK and Italy around one in five related to physical 
threats, including terrorism and disease.27
Research has also shown that the prevalence of these 
narratives is not highly dependent on local realities. Donatella 
Bonansinga’s research into attitudes towards Islam in the 
Czech Republic found that Islamophobic sentiments are 
gathering momentum and rising quickly, although the 
country’s Muslim population is ‘tantamount to zero’. 
Bonansinga hypothesises that media representations 
and political rhetoric are to blame for such trends:
The construction of otherness as referred to the Muslim culture 
is channelling fears about an allegedly inevitable clash of 
civilisations. In addition, problems concerning immigration to 
Europe have given birth to dramatic fears of an invasion, as these 
constant flows of people on the move are perceived as a challenge 
and threat to both national identities and security.28
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Anti-immigrant rhetoric may be the clearest example of the 
populist influence on contemporary political discourse in 
Europe, but the politics of fear, and the policies of fear, are 
driving wedges between many different societal and cultural 
groups. In particular, the divisions of nationalism and 
authoritarianism against liberal values are being fought in 
the public debates around patriotism and the ‘legitimacy’ 
of different voices and opinions. In this context, the ‘you’re 
either with us or against us’ narrative is threatening to stifle 
free debate, and side-lining the important contributions of 
‘experts’ – now considered enemies of the state for their lack 
of blind national optimism. Nowhere has this become more 
evident than in the aftermath of the European Referendum, 
where even fundamental institutions, such as the Bank of 
England and the Supreme Court, have been politicised to the 
extent that major daily newspapers have ‘named and shamed’ 
individual judges and called for marches on the court.29
Any caution or concern expressed about the UK’s 
vote to leave the European Union is now branded as an act 
of ‘Remoaning’ by some of the nation’s most influential 
news outlets, and views of dissent outside the framework 
of acceptable commentary are labelled treacherous. This 
dangerous new narrative – perhaps the most explicit form 
of ‘othering’, with implied consequences for citizenship – is 
a clear obstacle to maintaining a unified society, and threatens 
to obscure the urgency of addressing many of the other 
divisions and conflicts already at play, and the inequalities 
of power and agency between those asserting and subscribing 
to the narrative itself.
Citizens
Finally, how much of this culture of fear is reflected in 
changing individual identities? Are we seeing new, exclusive 
nationalisms at the expense of more inclusive identities and 
transnational solidarity?
As early as 2004, academics such as Mary Kaldor were 
arguing that a ‘new’ nationalism was on the rise as a direct 
response to globalisation.30 Today many commentators believe 
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that the rise of right-wing populist parties is linked to global 
economic trends, with the core support for these parties 
coming from blue-collar workers whose career prospects 
have been damaged by competition from emerging markets, 
migrant labour and in some cases the austerity policies 
imposed by governments and EU institutions.31 In their 
2015 book European Populism in the Shadow of the Great 
Recession, Hanspeter Kriesi and Takis Pappas argue:
The lack of responsiveness of established parties to the plight of the 
‘globalisation losers’ provided a chance for their mobilisation by the 
new populist right… the success of the new challengers was mainly 
due to their appeal to the cultural anxieties of the ‘losers’, which, 
given the ‘losers’’ heterogeneous economic interests, provided the 
lowest common denominator for their mobilisation.32
This is influenced by and feeds into pessimism and a lack of 
social trust. Research by Demos into the attitudes of online 
supporters of populist movements across Europe found that 
these groups had very low levels of optimism about their 
country’s future: only 10 per cent felt their country was ‘on 
the right track’.33 However, this pessimism was also evident 
– albeit to a lesser extent – in the wider population with only 
28 per cent thinking the same across the European population 
as a whole. Similarly, when asked a standard question of social 
trust – whether ‘most people can be trusted’ – our online 
study of populist supporters found that they tended to be 
more fearful or sceptical of others, with 33 per cent saying   
yes compared with a European average of 40 per cent.
Trends in national identity and attitudes often coincide 
with negative sentiments towards supranational identity 
and institutions: Carey, for example, found a negative 
relationship between national pride and attitudes towards EU 
integration.34 In the UK, there has been a clear trend towards 
a more exclusive sense of English national identity: in 1992, 
31 per cent felt English and 62 per cent British, while in 2014, 
43 per cent felt exclusively English and the same proportion 
British. This Englishness is related to attitudes towards the 
European Union, with 52 per cent of those identifying as 
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English supporting Leave against 32 per cent of those who 
felt British.
Although the UK is to some extent an outlier in this 
regard – regularly coming bottom of Eurobarometer surveys 
of European identity – attachment to the EU as an institution 
is low across Europe. Just 11 per cent of EU citizens feel 
‘very attached’ to the EU, compared with 56 per cent who 
feel attached to their country and 52 per cent who feel 
attached to their city, town or village.35 This lack of 
attachment, combined with a rising politics of fear and its 
populist manifestations, could have severe consequences 
for the future of the EU.
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Cross-national surveys
In 2016, we conducted cross-national surveys of citizens 
in France, Germany, Great Britain, Poland, Spain and 
Sweden, which revealed a widespread sense of precariousness, 
uncertainty and pessimism, which was most clearly evidenced 
in public opinion on political trust and the EU, and 
respondents’ expectations for the future. In particular   
the polling found:
 · low levels of trust in both EU and national-level governments 
and political institutions
 · greater proportions of citizens in each country (with the 
exception of Spain) expecting things to get worse rather 
than better for their country and for Europe as a whole
 · majorities (Britain, France, Sweden) or significant minorities 
(Germany, Poland, Spain) wanting to reduce the EU’s   
powers or leave it all together
Opinions were more mixed when it came to questions on the 
impact of recent societal changes – with majorities in most 
countries holding favourable views on female participation 
in the labour market and same-sex relationships. By contrast a 
greater proportion of citizens in France, Germany and Poland 
thought that greater ethnic diversity had made their countries 
worse rather than better off, while the reverse was true in 
Britain, Spain and Sweden.
Perhaps surprisingly, our polling found significant 
majorities holding positive views about the impact of 
globalisation on Europe, their country, their local area and 
their own lives. The only exception here came from the French 
polling where half of people felt that globalisation had had 
a negative impact on France.
We review the findings from our cross-national polling 
in greater detail below.
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Euroscepticism
In every country, there is either a majority or a substantial 
minority in favour reducing the EU’s powers or leaving
it altogether. Unsurprisingly, Great Britain is the most 
Eurosceptic, with 45 per cent (51 per cent excluding don’t 
knows) wanting to leave the EU. Germany is the most 
pro-European with half (48 per cent) wanting either to leave 
things as they are to increase the EU’s powers, although 
16 per cent expressed a desire to leave the EU (fi gure 1).
Figure 1   Preferences of respondents in each country, on their 
country’s long-term policy on the EU
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Attitudes to globalisation
We also asked our survey respondents about globalisation. 
This is a difficult subject to poll because it is so multi-faceted, 
and means different things to different people. Rather than 
using the term explicitly, we described the current situation 
as one where:
Over recent decades the world has become more interconnected. 
There is greater free trade between countries and easier 
communication across the globe. Money, people, cultures,   
jobs and industries all move more easily between countries.
We asked respondents whether they thought this trend had 
had a positive or negative effect at four levels: Europe as a 
whole, their country, their local area, and their own lives. 
Overwhelmingly, and somewhat surprisingly, respondents 
were generally positive about globalisation across the four 
measures. Poland was the most positive about the effect of 
globalisation on Europe, with 79 per cent of respondents 
believing the impact had been positive. French respondents 
were the most sceptical, with 46 per cent saying it had been 
positive for Europe, 41 per cent negative, with the remaining 
13 per cent answering ‘don’t know’ (figure 2).
Most participants across all countries agreed that 
globalisation had had a positive impact on their local area 
and their own lives, again with Poland the most positive 
and France the more balanced, with just 42 per cent   
answering ‘fairly’ (35 per cent) or ‘very’ (7 per cent) positive, 
and 41 per cent answering ‘fairly’ (27 per cent) or ‘very’ 
(14 per cent) negative. While significant majorities in 
Britain, Germany, Poland, Spain and Sweden agreed that 
globalisation had had a positive impact on their country, 
French respondents disagreed, with only 39 per cent believing 
it had been positive and 50 per cent negative (figure 3).
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Figure 2  Views of respondents in each country who believe 
globalisation has been positive or negative for Europe 
as a whole
Figure 3  Percentage of respondents in each country who 
believe globalisation has been positive or negative 
for their country
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Pessimism
On the other hand, we found that respondents in all
countries – with the consistent exception of Spain – were 
overwhelmingly pessimistic about prospects for the next 12 
months. Large minorities or even majorities in Britain, France, 
Germany and Sweden thought things would get worse for 
Europe as a whole in the next year, while citizens in Poland 
and Spain felt things would get neither better nor worse. Th e 
same trend was seen when we asked about prospects for the 
respondent’s country: pluralities in Britain, France, Germany 
and Sweden believe things will get worse, while those in 
Poland and Spain are more evenly split (fi gure 4).
Figure 4  Percentage of respondents in each country who think 
things will get better of worse for their country over
the next 12 months
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Political trust
We also asked our survey respondents about their levels   
of trust in national and European political institutions. We 
found strikingly low levels of trust across all measures, and in 
all countries. On a scale from 0 to 10, we found that more than 
half of respondents in Britain, France, Germany and Spain 
have low levels of trust (0–4) in the European Commission. 
Particularly surprising is that French respondents had less 
trust (56 per cent 0–4) in the Commission than British 
respondents (51 per cent) (figure 5).
Figure 5  Percentage of respondents reporting low levels of trust 
(0–4 on a 10-point scale) in the European Commission
Conversely, while levels of trust in British political 
institutions were not as low (45 per cent polling 0–4 for 
British government, 43 per cent for parliament), French 
respondents had even lower trust in national institutions 
than EU bodies: 71 per cent of French respondents reported 
low levels of trust in their government, and 65 per cent for 
the parliament (figure 6).
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Figure 6  Percentage of respondents reporting low levels of trust 
(0–4 on a 10-point scale) in their national government
Societal changes
Our polling on societal changes found Spain and Sweden 
to be the most socially liberal countries, particularly in 
their support for more women going to work (80 per cent 
and 74 per cent) and sexual equality (74 per cent and 67 per 
cent). However, we also found broad support for female 
participation in the labour market and same-sex relationships 
across the other four countries (with the exception of Poland 
on same-sex relationships).
That said, small but not insignificant minorities of 
around 10 per cent in each member state think that women’s 
economic participation has changed society for the worse, 
although twice as many people in Poland (13 per cent), 
Germany (12 per cent) and Great Britain (12 per cent) believe 
this than in Sweden (6 per cent). The Polish (35 per cent) and 
British (17 per cent) are most likely to regard the acceptance 
of same-sex marriage as having been a negative development.
However, it is clear that increased religious and ethnic 
diversity is a much more divisive issue, which gains 
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signifi cantly less support in the countries we polled. Spain
(50 per cent), Sweden (41 per cent) and – perhaps surprisingly 
– Britain (41 per cent) are the most supportive of diversity, and 
they are twice as likely to see a positive societal impact than
in France, Germany and Poland. In these countries a higher 
proportion of people say that ethnic diversity has changed 
society for the worse than the better (eg, in France 46 per cent 
of people say it has changed society for the worse, compared 
with 21 per cent saying the reverse) (fi gure 7).
Figure 7  Percentage of respondents who think that
changes in relation to women in the labour market,
same-sex relationships, and ethnicity and diversity
have ‘improved society for the better’
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European case studies
Our six country case studies provide a deeper understanding 
of the drivers and symptoms of the politics of fear through 
a detailed analysis of national specificities. Each provides 
a different analytical perspective and takes a different 
methodological approach, taking account of national 
contexts and trends.
In France, we find a toxic political atmosphere, 
dominated by negative voting intentions, and a population 
divided between a majority that continues to view the Front 
National in strongly negative terms, set against a sizeable 
minority that see its leader Marine le Pen as, ‘strong’ and 
a ‘realist’. This political context is underpinned by a more 
widespread sense of anxiety and crisis, linked to recent 
attacks, and economic uncertainty.
In Germany, by contrast, citizens’ concerns are shown 
to be more closely tied to specific issues around the EU’s 
impact in key areas of policy, including social security and 
EU payments. The findings here reveal there is a significant 
gap between the views of the public and those of German 
politicians, who tend not to recognise these concrete concerns 
and instead speak of a generalised sense of fear among 
their citizens.
In Poland, while socioeconomic grievances have played 
a role in the electoral success of the Law and Justice party, 
their rise to power also reflects a clear backlash against liberal 
and European values. The Polish case study argues that the 
dissemination of systematic political lies and conspiracy 
theory through social and alternative media has been 
a key component of the populist right’s success.
In the UK we find similar social and cultural 
underpinnings to the Brexit vote, although these are shown 
to be heavily intertwined with economic and educational 
inequalities. Social networks are also found to be significant 
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– internationally and intranationally – with those people 
who have recently socialised with someone from either a 
different country or a different UK city more likely to have 
voted Remain.
Even in the home of social democratic liberalism, 
Sweden, our findings show a similar (if slighter) turn towards 
ethnically defined conceptions of national identity in Swedish 
political discourse. That said, the public polling also reflects 
the continued strength of civic understandings of identity in 
Sweden, albeit with Sweden Democrats voters more likely to 
hold a mixture of civic and ethnic conceptions.
Spain stands as an outlier, with no significant right-wing 
populist gains despite seemingly fertile conditions – having 
been particularly impacted by the economic crisis and with 
high levels of immigration. The Spanish research – ‘the 
Spanish exception’ – suggests that this unique situation 
is linked to Spain’s political past, its current electoral 
system, and the failure of its far-right parties to modernise. 
However, polling findings from Spain on support for reduced 
immigration present a warning against complacency even in 
this country.
The following chapters explore these case studies in 
detail, and the findings of surveys and interviews conducted 
in each country with both citizens and elites during the second 
half of 2016.
In-depth analysis of each of these case studies can 
be found in the full report, Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself.
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Responding to the politics 
of fear: principles for good 
leadership, government 
and policy-making
This project has identified a wide range of fears and 
insecurities plaguing European member states and the 
continent as a whole – some of which are rooted in specific, 
practical circumstances and others which more reflect a 
particular mood, whether a sense of personal precariousness 
or national malaise. To restore the solidarity, optimism and 
support for liberalism essential to underpinning peace, 
security and openness in Europe, it is clear that citizens’ fears, 
whether based in economic ‘realities’ or social and cultural 
‘feelings’, must be taken seriously by political representatives 
at all levels – but responding to them, and rebuilding trust, 
will necessitate effective public policy initiatives and strong 
political leadership.
Below we set out some of the core principles of 
leadership, governance and public policy-making that could 
support such renewal at EU and national levels, with the 
support of civil society and other non-governmental 
institutions (NGOs).
Promote safety and security
Citizens across Europe are pessimistic and anxious about the 
future, and a significant minority of people feel ‘left behind’ 
by the current system. National and EU-level governments 
need to promote policies and political discourses that seek to 
allay fears, address concrete concerns and more proactively 
foster social cohesion. This requires moral and principled 
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leadership on the part of political leaders, and targeted policy 
interventions to address the economic, social and cultural 
factors driving insecurity and dislocation.
Our cross-national polling confirmed there is a 
widespread sense of pessimism, precariousness and anxiety 
across our case study countries. Some of these concerns relate 
to the economy and national security, which have continued 
to simmer or gain force since the financial crisis and the recent 
escalation of terror incidents, but others pertain more to 
feelings of social and cultural loss. It is clear that these two 
dimensions are becoming increasingly intertwined, together 
fuelling personal anxieties and a feeling that political leaders 
and institutions are no longer able to offer control and security 
to citizens.
Within each nation, our findings show that while 
feelings of insecurity and instability may be widespread, 
they are felt more strongly by certain groups – those with 
more conservative social values, and with lower income 
and education levels. Our research has therefore provided 
empirical evidence to support the concept of the ‘left behinds’, 
both economically and culturally defined. It seems that across 
most of our case study countries there is a significant minority 
of the population (10–20 per cent) who are deeply pessimistic 
about the future and feel out of step with contemporary 
societal values.
In responding to the current febrile atmosphere political 
leaders should consider the approaches discussed below.
Provide genuine moral leadership, to act as a stabilising 
and guiding hand in response to public anxiety and fear
The Realpolitik motivations for referendums in the UK 
and Italy have spectacularly backfired on their proponents, 
and only served to heighten civic anxiety and division. 
Furthermore, governments’ ‘adoptive’ strategy in responding 
to populist rhetoric has led mainstream parties, particularly in 
the UK and France, to foster a negative and divisive political 
discourse around issues such as immigration and EU 
integration.36 This tendency was most starkly reflected in 
our French polling, which found that twice as many people 
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expected their vote to be driven by negative motivations 
(to prevent a candidate they disapprove of winning) than 
positive ones (choosing the best candidate) in the upcoming 
national elections.
Angela Merkel’s chancellorship presents an alternative 
approach, marked by a steadfast commitment to her refugee 
policy and an assertion that ‘fear cannot be a counsel for 
political action’.37 While Merkel’s approval ratings have 
fluctuated, they still remain far ahead of her European 
counterparts.38 Clearly, the 2016 Christmas terror attack in 
Berlin represents a significant challenge to Merkel’s policies 
and approach, but again she has remained unwavering in 
her calls for national unity, based around values of openness, 
freedom and humanity.39
While politicians must recognise that the recent populist 
uprisings reflect genuine concerns about the direction of travel 
in their country and the broader world that must be 
addressed, this should not come at the expense of principled, 
stable leadership that seeks to build long-term social and 
economic growth and enrichment. Politicians may feel they 
are representing the views of their people by bowing to 
populist rhetoric in the short term, but the fact remains that 
citizens also fundamentally expect higher moral leadership 
from their politicians than from almost any other profession.40 
Political leaders should therefore seek to promote more 
positive and hopeful visions of the future, which can act 
as a cohesive force to build national unity.
Deliver targeted policy interventions
These policy interventions should address the concerns of ‘left 
behind’ or vulnerable groups, and more proactively promote 
social and community cohesion. The policy response to the 
politics of fear must include initiatives that attempt to tackle 
economic insecurity and inequality directly – through 
inclusive growth strategies, education and skills investment, 
and regulatory interventions to reduce the precariousness of 
low-skilled work. However, there is also a need for a more 
proactive approach to address some of the cultural drivers of 
the politics of fear – especially, as reflected in our polling, the 
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perception that immigration has not been matched by 
social integration, and that cultural pluralism is threatening 
long-established, deep-rooted aspects of national identity.
For example, the recent Casey Review in the UK has 
shone light on the UK government’s piecemeal approach 
to promoting social cohesion, and has called for greater 
government investment in English language support, 
social mixing initiatives and the emancipation of women 
in conservative religious communities.41 Without addressing 
areas of clear failure in integration policy, the positive 
arguments for immigration, whether based on moral 
values or interests, will remain subordinate to feelings of 
cultural infringement among large minorities of citizens.
Examples of more proactive approaches to promoting 
cohesion in our case study countries often come from civil 
society initiatives. This includes Sweden’s ÖppnaDörren, 
which aims to help and encourage newcomers and more 
established Swedes to build connections and friendships, 
through dinners, monthly meetings and opportunities to 
build professional networks. Another approach, pioneered 
in the German city of Mannheim, is community dialogue – 
a forum for different sections of a diverse community to 
come together in facilitated discussion to establish 
common concerns and priorities for the city.
National and local governments can play a role in 
supporting and scaling effective civil society programmes, 
as well as facilitating better cross-sector working. This is 
the approach taken in the Polish city of Bialystok, which 
in response to a spike in hate crime launched a multi-agency 
initiative to tackle racism and xenophobia in the city, 
including special training for municipal police officers, and 
developed an online platform run by civil society groups to 
report racist or xenophobic graffiti.
Support a more focused EU
There should be support for a more focused EU, 
which can achieve tangible successes in areas crucial to 
underpinning the sense of economic and physical security 
that encourages citizens to favour openness over nationalism. 
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There was widespread consensus in our consultations with 
national and civil society practitioners that the EU should 
concentrate on a stronger, more core remit of responsibilities 
– enabling it to deliver more comprehensively on a reduced 
number of areas, and avoiding the ‘over-reach’ that contributes 
to a sense of disenfranchisement among citizens. Ultimately, 
the more the EU can be seen to achieve successes in ‘big 
ticket’ policy areas outside social and cultural frameworks 
– which our research shows is viewed as the preserve of 
national governments by most of the public – the more it 
will help foster the sense of security essential to promoting 
togetherness over division.
These responsibilities will include levers that emphasise 
cooperation and solidarity – but to productive and tangible 
ends, such as on security, counter-terror and immigration 
policy. The most recent Eurobarometer (86) lends support to 
this view, finding substantial majorities in favour of current 
EU policy priorities around freedom of movement, common 
defence and security policy, and common energy policy.42
EU leaders can also play a role in promoting safety   
and security by re-orientating policy to position the EU not 
simply as an architect of globalisation, but as a protector 
against the global economy’s destabilising effects at local 
levels. Importantly, the EU has the opportunity to promote 
just, as well as free, trade. Major trade deals such as the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
have been perceived to favour corporate interests at the 
expense of public scrutiny and protection, leading the EU’s 
Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia Malmström, to declare that 
the EU must ‘do more to engage people at national level and 
to find a new European consensus on trade’.43 This involves 
securing trade deals that explicitly protect workers’ rights and 
enable national governments to hold big business to account.
Reconnect ‘political elites’ and citizens
Political leaders need to address a crisis in political trust 
through measures that reinforce and rejuvenate representative 
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democracy and political accountability. The recent increase 
in the use of referendums across Europe demonstrates a 
failure of effective representation, with many serving only to 
inflame, rather than settle, divisive issues.44 There is therefore 
a pressing need for new mechanisms which enable politicians 
to understand the concerns of citizens more constructively, 
and provide clear lines of accountability to political 
decision-making.
Our findings point to a crisis in political trust. For 
some countries, trust in national governments is higher than 
trust in the EU (particularly the UK), while for others the 
reverse is true (particularly Poland and Spain) – however, 
trust is chronically low throughout. The German case study, 
in particular, revealed a significant disconnect between 
public opinion – rooted in concrete concerns about the 
EU’s influence on national contexts – and the views of many 
German politicians – diagnosing the problem as a diffuse 
and nebulous sense of fear. There is therefore an urgent 
need to address this disconnect between politicians and 
citizens, and the low trust environment that is both its cause 
and symptom.
Participatory or deliberative forms of democracy can 
be seen as a possible silver bullet for tackling a lack of faith 
in the political system. And there are notable examples of 
well-structured deliberative approaches that have been 
successful at engaging citizens and generating informed 
debate and public contribution (eg, the Irish Convention on 
the Constitution and Iceland’s Constitutional Council).45 
However, attempts at deliberation at the EU level have largely 
been ineffective – with only three campaigns under the EU’s 
flagship European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) managing to 
fulfil requirements to be heard by the Commission (1 million 
signatures, from seven countries, relating to an issue within 
the EU’s competencies).46
At the national level, calls for greater democratic 
participation have largely been met through a rise in the 
number of referendums, which have had destabilising 
effects on national democracies and have contributed to 
what Belgian author David Van Reybrouck calls ‘democratic 
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fatigue syndrome’, with more intensive electoral politics 
actually serving to undermine trust and engagement.47
In restoring trust, while direct and participatory 
approaches can provide an important supplement to existing 
democratic processes, there is a need to get the fundamentals 
– of democratic accountability and representation – right first. 
This impetus can be supported in the following ways.
Reduce the remoteness of ‘political elites’
In order to make political elites less remote it is necessary 
to create more effective mechanisms for dialogue between 
politicians and citizens, and initiatives to make parliaments 
more reflective of the wider population. There is a pressing 
need to reduce the considerable (and seemingly rising) social 
and geographic gap between politicians and citizens. Part 
of the answer must involve bringing politics down to a local 
level. This could be done through developing forums and 
instruments to enable greater dialogue between national 
politicians and their local communities. There is a clear 
role for civil society organisations to act as a bridge between 
local communities and local, national and supranational 
politics. Maison d’Europe is an example of an initiative in 
France that works to connect local communities to EU-level 
politics through conferences, which provide a forum to 
connect people to EU institutions and politicians. The 
membership arms of political parties can also be influential 
in embedding politics, and even policy development, at a 
local level.
Making parliaments more reflective of the wider 
population in gender, ethnicity and socioeconomic 
background is also central to reducing the remoteness of 
politics from people’s lives. On gender, for example, despite 
some gains in recent elections women are still in a minority 
in lower or single parliamentary houses in all our case study 
countries, ranging from 43.6 per cent in Sweden to just 26.2 
per cent in France.48 More effort needs to be made on both 
the demand side (recruiting politicians from diverse 
backgrounds) and supply side (providing leadership 
opportunities for under-represented groups).
49
Civil society organisations can play a role here also. 
In the UK, for example, a programme called Reclaim (based 
in Manchester) aims to encourage community and political 
leaders from working-class backgrounds by supporting young 
people from deprived communities to deliver a social change 
project over two years in their community.49
Support democratic and policy-making processes that build 
rather than undermine trust
Referendums should be used sparingly and implemented 
better when needed; the policy-making process should be 
more transparent and open to external input. They are an 
appropriate democratic instrument in specific circumstances 
– particularly, where there has been a significant shift in 
public opinion, which requires the public to ratify a related 
change in policy direction collectively (eg, the 2015 Irish 
referendum on same-sex marriage, which passed with 62 per 
cent of the vote). However, recently referendums have been 
more often used as a political tool to resolve internal political 
conflicts (within the Conservative party in the UK) or 
external political conflicts (between the Hungarian 
government and the EU over refugees).
This motivation undermines representative democracy, 
with governments abdicating decision-making to settle their 
own political disputes. If a referendum is required, there needs 
to be a fundamental reassessment of how they are structured 
and delivered – to ensure that people are better informed and 
engaged, and campaigns are seen to be factually sound.
There is scope for resolving specific political issues 
through well-thought-through deliberative mechanisms 
as an alternative to referendums, ranging from light-touch 
approaches that involve large numbers of people, to more 
intensive processes, including sortition-based citizens’ 
councils. Digital technology has the potential to widen the 
reach of these initiatives dramatically. For example, since 2014 
Paris has been experimenting with a crowd-sourcing approach 
to participatory budgeting, through which residents are 
provided with online and face-to-face forums to submit, and 
vote on, ideas for how to spend a budget of €426 million 
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between 2014 and 2020 (5 per cent of the city’s investment 
budget).50 In the 2016 spending round nearly 160,000 
Parisians voted on how to allocate that year’s budget of €100 
million, an increase in participation of 40 per cent on the 
previous year.51 The Paris example demonstrates both the 
potential and the limitations of deliberative approaches 
– while it has been able to engage large numbers of people, 
those involved are still only a fraction of the 2.2 million 
population of Paris. Although deliberative initiatives can be 
deployed effectively to build trust and engagement on specific 
issues, or to foster more structured debate around the 
traditional electoral process, they still lack the representative 
legitimacy of electoral democracy.
Furthermore, policy-making itself needs to become 
a tool for engendering trust rather that an opaque or 
technocratic process conducted in conversations between 
politicians and civil servants behind closed doors. For 
example, the UK government has committed to making   
‘open policy-making’ the norm under its Civil Service Reform 
Plan – though the results so far have been limited to small 
innovations applied to narrow areas of policy.52
True open policy-making requires far more transparency 
over the policy design process – setting out overall aims and 
the options for change, and encouraging a truly consultative 
process that gathers expertise and input more widely. This 
should apply across all levels of government – from local 
community and neighbourhood plans, to national policy 
conversations, to greater transparency and openness within 
the EU legislature.
Boost the accountability of EU institutions and policy-makers 
at EU level
The accountability of EU institutions and policy-makers can 
be improved by making information on the legislative and 
decision-making process more readily available, making more 
active efforts to disseminate this information, supporting 
public engagement, and ensuring that the nuances of national 
debates are better represented at the supranational level. As 
a result of the actual and perceived distance between EU 
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legislators and citizens, transparency is often seen as a 
panacea to problems of low public trust and legitimacy.53 
A particular area of concern in this regard is the consolidation 
of decision-making power within the Council of Ministers, 
which prioritises behind-closed-doors negotiations between 
representatives of national governments. The lack of 
transparency at the Council level threatens the EU’s 
accountability – with limited indication of decision-making 
responsibilities, and its representativeness failing to reflect 
the diversity of voices and positions within national 
political discourses.
Increasing the transparency of Council negotiations 
is therefore a much-needed step to supporting broader 
improvements in accountability across EU institutions. 
The European Ombudsman has recently made 
recommendations for greater transparency in EU trialogue 
negotiations – where representatives of the Council and 
Parliament (with assistance from the Commission) meet 
to discuss legislative changes – which include proposals 
to publish meeting dates, summary agendas, positions 
statements and the names of decision-makers.54 These 
recommendations could be applied more broadly to Council 
negotiations and would provide a means of significantly 
increasing publicly available information on decision-making 
within this forum.
However, this form of transparency – increasing the 
amount of publicly available information, which is the 
dominant understanding of transparency at the EU level 
– only goes so far in securing meaningful accountability. 
In a study of transparency within the Council since 1999, 
academics Jørgen Bølstad and James Cross argue that while 
the amount of public information has increased:
This does not necessarily translate into a broader public 
engagement with EU politics and increased understanding of 
how the EU makes decisions. For non-experts, the decision-making 
process remains byzantine, and the provision of access to legislative 
records has done little to ameliorate this fact.55
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Transparency therefore needs to be conceptualised in less of 
a corporate and more of a civic manner – beginning with the 
public provision of information, but followed by far more 
proactive attempts to disseminate this information in a way 
that draws clear lines of accountability and actively engages 
the public.
As well as increasing accountability, to address EU 
shortcomings in legitimacy and trust it is also necessary to 
make stronger efforts to boost the representativeness of EU 
institutions. Increasing transparency at the Council level 
would have no significant impact on this as it fails to deal with 
a more fundamental issue – put forward by constitutional 
academic Vernon Bogdanor – that European elections ‘do not 
determine or even substantially influence the development of 
the Union… they do not determine the political colour of the 
Union, how it is to be governed, for they do not affect the 
composition of the Commission, nor, of course, of the Council 
of Ministers’.56
Part of the answer lies in ensuring the full 
implementation of the so-called ‘Interinstitutional agreement 
on better law-making’ introduced in 2016, which sets out the 
principle of ‘equal footing’ of Parliament and the Council.57 
Beyond this, citizens need to be given more confidence that 
their vote genuinely influences the EU’s policy-making 
agenda, through strengthening the powers and visibility of 
the European Parliament (and its MEPs) in developing policy 
and delivering outcomes at the EU level.
Make the case for openness and liberalism
With illiberal, nationalist political discourse ascendant, 
there is an urgent need to put forward a more persuasive 
case for liberalism – one that promotes liberal values of 
openness, international cooperation, pluralism and respect 
for fundamental human rights and freedoms, but in a way 
that is more meaningful for ordinary people.
Pro-liberal politicians and institutions must become 
far more proactive and adept at building coalitions around 
collective interests (which cut across traditional political 
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divides), engaging in – and helping to shape – national 
debates around identity and immigration, and ensuring that 
the benefits of international openness are experienced more 
widely across society.
Our findings indicate that while Europe is not 
experiencing an absolute rejection of liberal values – with 
majorities in most countries holding liberal attitudes towards 
issues such as same-sex relationships and female participation 
in the labour market – there has been a slide towards more 
authoritarian and socially conservative views, particularly 
around ethnicity and immigration. In France, Germany and 
Poland, in particular, a higher proportion of people feel that 
greater ethnic and religious diversity has had a negative effect 
on their country rather than been a positive influence. And 
even traditionally liberal Spain and Sweden have seen a 
hardening of opinion on immigration. There is a sense,   
then, that anti-liberal rhetoric is cutting through to public 
opinion far more effectively and reopening debates previously 
thought settled.
So, why have liberal arguments failed to effectively speak 
to people?
First, and particularly, at the EU level, there has been 
an over-emphasis on explaining the functions and structures 
of the political process and institutions (so-called ‘input 
legitimacy’) at the expense of genuine citizen engagement. 
This has been ineffective at two levels – in genuinely 
informing people about the EU (public awareness about EU 
institutions and competencies remains low) and in promoting 
any kind of pro-EU, pro-cooperation consensus. The 2015 
Eurobarometer (83), for example, found that there was no 
correlation between people’s level of knowledge about the 
EU and pro-EU sentiment.58
Second, where liberals at national and EU levels have 
focused more on promoting values, these have too often been 
discussed in an abstract form, or in ways that presuppose their 
universality and ubiquity. Both the content and source of these 
arguments are important. As American social psychologist 
Jonathan Haidt has argued, the ‘new cosmopolitan elite… acts 
and talks in ways that insult, alienate, and energize many of 
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their fellow citizens, particularly those who have a 
psychological predisposition to authoritarianism’.59
There is therefore a need to reframe and re-energise 
the case for liberalism and openness, and there are a number 
of clear steps that can be taken to achieve this, which are 
discussed below.
Develop pro-liberal arguments around collective interests
It is necessary to develop pro-liberal arguments around 
collective interests – issues that matter to ordinary people 
and that cut across traditional party political lines – and 
demonstrate the concrete benefits of these positions. By 
focusing on interests, liberal arguments can move beyond the 
abstract and the technocratic, and begin to make a compelling 
case for the concrete benefits of international openness, 
pluralism and diversity to ordinary people’s lives (‘output 
legitimacy’). Crucially, they can reach out to people who 
may not be self-identifying ‘liberals’, but who ultimately share 
common concerns and hopes for their families, communities 
and country’s place in the world. This requires liberals to be 
proactive in reaching across traditional political divides, to 
create coalitions over shared interests – even if the motivation 
behind the interest or its policy manifestation may be 
complementary rather than matched.
Areas for possible coalition-building include 
immigration policy, where social liberals could feasibly reach 
out to business and free marketers to resist more nationalistic, 
protectionist reforms to immigration policy. Liberals could 
even attempt to capitalise on new political space created by 
populist insurgents where their interests or aims align. This 
is particularly the case with the social interventionist, big 
government elements of current populist discourse – so 
evident in both Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen’s anti-free-
trade protectionism – which liberals should engage with to 
develop a broad consensus in support of improved social 
protection and more humane welfare policy.
Practise values of openness and pluralism
Pro-liberal politicians and institutions should put values of 
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openness and pluralism into practice by supporting initiatives 
that enable positive, and ultimately consensus-building, 
debates on issues such as identity, nationalism and 
immigration. There has often been a temptation for liberals to 
actively dismiss or more passively avoid debates on potentially 
divisive issues linked to national identity, but this approach 
risks leaving the argument to be framed, uncontested, by the 
populist right. The narrowness of the Remain campaign’s 
message during the UK Referendum, framed predominantly 
in economic terms, points to the potential consequences of 
failing to shape the wider debate.60 There are warning signs 
that similar mistakes are being made in countries where there 
has not yet been a populist upsurge – particularly Spain, 
where our polling found that 40 per cent of people would vote 
for a party pledging to reduce immigration. This, more than 
any other issue, has also been ‘under-discussed’ in many 
Western nations, which can eventually fuel the rise of parties 
willing to challenge normative viewpoints.
Liberals therefore need to take an active role in shaping 
the boundaries and content of these discussions – which will 
require a careful balance to be struck between contesting 
discriminatory rhetoric and ensuring that a defence of identity 
politics does not stifle free and open debate.
Framing the public conversation is a crucial aspect of 
political leadership, and must be conducted in good faith and 
with legitimacy. In 2010, the French government under 
President Nicholas Sarkozy launched a national debate on 
French identity, involving over one hundred local town hall 
meetings across France. However, they were seen as a political 
tool to bolster support from the right in the run-up to regional 
elections. Rather than building consensus, the framing of the 
debates fanned the flames of nationalism and xenophobia – 
by emphasising divisive issues like the burqa. Despite initial 
public support for the initiative, by their conclusion, only 33 
per cent of those polled considered them to be constructive 
and 61 per cent said the process had in no way defined what 
being French means.61
An alternative approach would be to frame debates 
more actively around points of commonality than points of 
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difference, as argued by Karen Stenner, author of 
The Authoritarian Dynamic:
It would seem that we can best limit intolerance of difference 
by parading, talking about, and applauding our sameness… 
Ultimately, nothing inspires greater tolerance from the intolerant 
than an abundance of common and unifying beliefs, practices, 
rituals, institutions, and processes.62
There is also a need for greater inclusivity in debates   
around European values, providing space for more socially 
conservative voices: not watering down liberal positions, but 
preventing the exclusion of those who may be susceptible to 
right-wing populist rhetoric.
A potentially instructive example can be found in the 
Commission’s rejection of the ‘One of Us’ campaign in 2014 
– one of the few initiatives of the ECI actually to gain the 
required number of signatures. This initiative, which garnered 
1.8 million signatures, predominantly from Italy and Germany 
(and backed by the Catholic church), called on the EU to ‘ban 
and end the financing of activities which presuppose the 
destruction of human embryos’. While few liberals would 
question the Commission’s ultimate decision in this case, there 
was clearly a need to provide an outlet to continue the debate 
and better engage with those who felt strongly on this issue 
to explain in concrete (rather than abstract liberal) terms why 
the Commission rejected the initiative. The flat dismissal may 
simply have left those backing the campaign with the sense 
that the EU is not for them.
Ensure that the benefits of openness and diversity 
are experienced more widely
The benefits of openness and diversity must be experienced 
more widely, particularly through supporting greater   
intra- and international mobility and engagement for 
socioeconomic groups unlikely to participate in existing 
initiatives. Our findings, particularly from the UK case study 
– which found that the size of people’s social networks 
significantly influences their attitudes towards liberalism, 
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international cooperation and cultural diversity – point  
to the need to ensure that people from groups with low 
socioeconomic status, education levels and mobility and/or 
from rural areas are given the same opportunities to travel and 
mix with people from different backgrounds as has become 
the norm among more affluent, cosmopolitan groups.
At the EU level, while policies like the Erasmus 
programme and data roaming are popular initiatives, they 
often only serve a narrow tranche of the European population: 
those who are already mobile and internationalist in outlook. 
More needs to be done, then, to support mixing between 
communities that are not currently served by these kinds of 
policies. The current Erasmus programme (Erasmus+) was 
originally titled Erasmus for All, with the intention of opening 
up the programme to volunteering, vocational and work-
related placements, as well as higher education and graduate 
schemes. The EU should invest more heavily in widening 
this programme to be more inclusive to those outside the 
university system, and reach out to schools, vocational 
learning institutions and community organisations to help 
them to provide resources and support to facilitate the 
application process.
The UK case study’s finding on social networks also 
demonstrates that mobility schemes within nations could 
be significant to fostering more liberal attitudes and 
potentially overcoming divisions wrought by hard-wired 
social perspectives and economic experiences. Currently, 
many governments only focus on integration policy from a 
racial perspective, but improving socioeconomic and rural–
metropolitan integration will be just as important to building 
more cohesive societies.
Civil society organisations have a potential role to play 
here in facilitating mixing at a national and community level. 
For example, the Carnegie UK Trust has recently launched its 
Twin Towns programme, which will provide financial support 
and expertise to enable ten small and medium-sized towns to 
trial bilateral ‘twinning’ arrangements over an 18-month 
period.63 So too could education systems and local councils 
place a stronger emphasis on building partnerships between 
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schools of differing circumstances – whether within 
communities or in different towns and cities – to 
expose children to a greater diversity of experience.
For adults, there is scope to consider schemes that 
encourage mixing for non-graduate working-age citizens 
– whether through paid voluntary international work 
placement schemes for individuals and their families 
in non-professional sectors, or by linking tax relief to 
community and civic participation. Government-administered 
community grants could also be structured to encourage 
support for projects that bring diverse groups together to 
share common experiences.
Counter post-truth narratives in politics  
and the media
Systematic manipulation of facts for political ends and the 
growing acceptance of conspiracy theories are emergent 
trends of particular concern, in part accelerated by new 
forms of social and alternative media.
According to Oxford Dictionaries, ‘post-truth’ was the 
word of 2016, fuelled by political campaigns in the USA and 
the UK that have had a notably loose relationship with the 
‘facts’. Aided by social and alternative media, political 
misinformation has become a systematic tool used to bolster 
populist campaigns.
The Polish case study presents the starkest evidence of 
this, describing how the Law and Justice party successfully 
campaigned on a narrative of ‘Poland in ruin’, despite rising 
living standards and falling inequality over the last decade. 
Our polling also found that Islamic terrorism had risen to the 
top of Poles’ concerns for their country, although there have 
been no reported terrorist attacks in Poland and the country 
has only a small Muslim population – a clear indication of the 
impact of Islamophobic campaigning from the populist right.
Where there is a sense that information or activities are 
being obfuscated, or that politicians are not acting in citizens’ 
interests, people will necessarily reduce their trust in formal 
institutions; the danger now is that we have entered an 
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information age, which privileges informal movements and 
provides the opportunity to construct echo chambers around 
preferred viewpoints.
Countering these false narratives and conspiracy 
theories will require decisive action from political 
representatives – addressing the issues that encourage 
susceptibility to their messages and rebuilding trust in   
their expertise, and the systems that support stable, 
democratic government.
Citizens must also be supported to differentiate between 
credible and non-credible news sources, by promoting media 
literacy and digital citizenship – whether through national 
education systems or more informal methods.
Pilot schemes designed and trialled by Demos have 
demonstrated promising achievements in preventing the 
online radicalisation of school students, equipping young 
people with the critical-thinking skills and media awareness 
to be able to evaluate the arguments and content presented  
by extremists. These pilots found statistically significant 
impacts on young people’s confidence in differentiating 
between truth and lies on social media,64 and could  
readily be applied to wider digital media literacy training  
to improve the public’s skills in critically assessing day-to-day 
political information.
Government-led initiatives in challenging post-truth 
politics will necessarily also need to be complemented by 
those facilitated by civil society and grassroots organisations, 
whose position outside the establishment may help afford 
them greater legitimacy in the short term. We must be clear 
that not all civil society organisations represent a benevolent 
force when it comes to combatting populist misinformation 
– with the populist movement in Poland, for instance, backed 
by a range of far-right or anti-liberal civic groups. Moreover, 
civil society organisations, particularly international NGOs, 
can be regarded as being part of ‘the establishment’ or serving 
‘foreign interests’, and hence can lack widespread agency. 
However, certain civil society voices, enjoying high levels of 
trust among the public, may have greater scope in contesting 
false narratives than mainstream political institutions.
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A number of civil society organisations have emerged 
in recent years with a mission to promote greater ‘truthfulness’ 
in public discourse. According to a report for the Reuters 
Institute at the University of Oxford, some 60 per cent of 
fact-checking outlets in Europe are ‘operating either as 
independent ventures or as projects of a civil society 
organisation’65 – including FullFact in the UK and 
Demagog in Poland. As well as targeting and challenging 
misinformation a number of civil society initiatives have 
been established that foster more evidence-based public 
debates. Mediendienst-Integration, based in Germany, is 
one such organisation, aiming to support accurate reporting 
of immigration-related news in the mainstream media. By 
providing information, resources and expert contributors 
for journalists, the organisation seeks to shift coverage 
‘from portraying “perceived truths” to [reporting] on 
empirical facts’.66
While these organisations can play an important role 
in shaping media and political narratives, they too can suffer 
from a lack of democratic accountability and popular 
legitimacy. Other initiatives are therefore attempting to take a 
more grassroots approach by building civil society’s resilience 
to ‘post-truth’ narratives and politics. One such organisation 
is the Committee for the Defence of Democracy (KOD), which 
has been able to mobilise 1.5 million Poles (5 per cent of the 
population) in protests against the manipulation of state 
institutions by the Polish government.67 As well as building a 
civic resistance to the current Polish government, KOD takes 
an overtly pro-European, pro-liberal stance, and is working   
to build a civic movement around these values and principles.
The EU has a potentially powerful role to play in 
supporting the incubation and scaling of these bottom-up 
organisations. As well as providing funding for these groups, 
the EU can provide capacity-building, coordination and 
networking support to ensure their longer-term sustainability. 
EU support clearly carries some risks in relation to grassroots 
authenticity and legitimacy. Ensuring transparency in funding 
and support criteria and allocation is therefore vital to refute 
claims of clandestine interference by the EU.
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Conclusions
This project has presented a snapshot of the ‘mood on the 
ground’ in six member states of Europe, during a period of 
increasing social and cultural crisis and political upheaval. 
Through a wide range of qualitative and quantitative methods 
– including surveys, interviews, focus groups and workshops 
– it has drilled beneath the surface of Europe’s ‘hidden crisis’, 
as it has become increasingly laid bare for all to see. It has 
allowed us to explore the nuances of how fear manifests in 
particular national contexts, and how cultural identities, 
histories and economic conditions intersect to foster 
conditions that support the rise of authoritarian, nationalist, 
populist or illiberal forces. Importantly, it has also captured 
the hard-wired social attitudes and mindsets that are being 
increasingly activated by populist parties and campaigns, to 
react against a period of unprecedented global connectivity 
and digital transformation.
The picture painted by the research is certainly cause 
for concern for those who would like to see Europe, and a 
post-Brexit UK, remain both cohesive within and open to the 
world. Nonetheless, as we have outlined above, there are clear 
pathways forward for those leaders with ambitions to restore 
and enhance the stability and success of the EU, and to 
promote stable, liberal democracies. Each principle will 
strengthen the next, and they must be undertaken with  
a spirit of urgency, inclusivity and vigour.
Attention should focus on how elites can restore trust 
in the fundamental institutions of our democracies, better 
articulate the myriad, shared benefits and strength of open 
societies, and encourage more diverse, challenging and 
free public debate on issues important to people’s social 
and cultural identity. Fundamentally, however, political 
parties and institutions must consider what practical role 
they can play in helping more citizens to feel safe in their 
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lives – whether through public policy levers or simply 
through more inclusive, emotionally attuned and morally 
responsible leadership.
There is no doubt that we are living through a transition 
that feels cataclysmic in nature – disruptive, challenging and 
potentially dangerous. But the question as to whether this is 
the beginning or the end of something has not yet been 
decided. It is important that European governments, and 
the EU itself, do not succumb to reactive policy-making 
and short-term thinking to try to ‘stem the tide’ of populism, 
nationalism and authoritarianism. Liberals may feel in a 
position of disadvantage, but as this research shows, there 
is still a fundamental, majority baseline of support for many 
liberal ideas and policies, which can surely be reactivated in 
the future. The road ahead will be hard, but with humility, 
conviction, creative energy, collaboration and perseverance, 
new shoots will grow.
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applicable law, the work is licenced on an ‘as is’ basis, without warranties of any kind, either 
express or implied including, without limitation, any warranties regarding the contents or 
accuracy of the work.
6 Limitation on Liability
 Except to the extent required by applicable law, and except for damages arising from liability 
to a third party resulting from breach of the warranties in section 5, in no event will licensor 
be liable to you on any legal theory for any special, incidental, consequential, punitive or 
exemplary damages arising out of this licence or the use of the work, even if licensor has 
been advised of the possibility of such damages.
7 Termination
a  This License and the rights granted hereunder will terminate automatically upon any breach 
by You of the terms of this License. Individuals or entities who have received Collective Works 
from You under this License, however, will not have their licences terminated provided such 
individuals or entities remain in full compliance with those licences. Sections 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 
will survive any termination of this License.
b  Subject to the above terms and conditions, the licence granted here is perpetual (for the 
duration of the applicable copyright in the Work). Notwithstanding the above, Licensor 
reserves the right to release the Work under different licence terms or to stop distributing 
the Work at any time; provided, however that any such election will not serve to withdraw 
this License (or any other licence that has been, or is required to be, granted under the terms 
of this License), and this License will continue in full force and effect unless terminated as 
stated above.
8 Miscellaneous
a  Each time You distribute or publicly digitally perform the Work or a Collective Work, Demos 
offers to the recipient a licence to the Work on the same terms and conditions as the licence 
granted to You under this License.
b  If any provision of this License is invalid or unenforceable under applicable law, it shall not 
affect the validity or enforceability of the remainder of the terms of this License, and without 
further action by the parties to this agreement, such provision shall be reformed to the 
minimum extent necessary to make such provision valid and enforceable.
c  No term or provision of this License shall be deemed waived and no breach consented to 
unless such waiver or consent shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged with 
such waiver or consent.
d  This License constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the Work 
licensed here. There are no understandings, agreements or representations with respect to 
the Work not specified here. Licensor shall not be bound by any additional provisions that 
may appear in any communication from You. This License may not be modified without the 
mutual written agreement of Demos and You.
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